People do things, but why? One type of motive is that of the itch; if I itch, I scratch, and no further words are required. Some actions are motivated by such direct desires, yet there are actions undertaken which cannot be said to be borne of such a simple relationship to desire. Very few actually enjoy physical exercise, and few still who desire to exercise: People exercise, generally, because they want something other than exercise which can be obtained through exercise.
But, does an actor always act in service to his desire? I am not now considering someone blundering, that is, someone who, having better knowledge or skill or luck, might have acted to attain his desire. I do not mean to consider accidental actions. I am asking whether or not someone might act without a desire to act, or act contrary to his desire. We might say that a man acted against his desire if his action was motivated by a threat. Note how we say motivated. Should a man be threatened to act against his desires, though he act against some of his desires, by the nature of what a threat is, by the nature of avoiding the threat, the man is pursuing one desire at the expense of another. So, like with exercise, to say that a man acts against his desire is to say that he acts against some desires for the sake of other desires. Perhaps another tack: We might say duty would entice a man to act apart from desire, but is duty a savior? Duty must first be recognized, and what is the recognition of duty save some form of desire: If I recognize a duty, I have already said that I want to be dutiful. Want, desire, motive: From these tyrants I spy no escape.
So, I say that action is borne of desire. Yet, the next question arises: Which desires? We have already considered that sometimes we act against our desires. So, a hierarchy exists. We have many desires, and they are often contrary, and somehow we discriminate among them. What? Discrimination, that is an act, and yet I thought we could not act without desire? So, do we truly discriminate among our desires? Here I may have discovered a freedom from desire: If we find that we judge our desires, which I believe we do, our judgment cannot in the end be based on those desires judged. Consider the question of exercise again: If I desire both to have health and to sit around all day watching YouTube and somehow I judge that health is generally better than amusement, than the judgement that my desire for health is a better desire is not an act of desire.
A challenger may say that what I am calling judgement is really one desire overpowering another. Yet I find in myself that the desire to exercise needs constant upkeep, is always fainting and dying. The desire to laziness is often strong. Yet, I judge the two. One is virtuous, and the other, if given its full head, sinful.
There seems, then, in my internal life, to be actions which are transcendent of what normally passes as motive.
Tale Told 